My research has grown out of wondering how things with intentional content (things like perceptual representations or desires) should be understood in relation to thoughtless, physical processes often called "lower-level" parts of nature (things like the activity in a neural network, or the flow of blood). I am now especially interested in the theoretical conception of the body of an intentional agent as it is relevant to questions that bridge neuroscience, cognitive science, psychology, and philosophy.
My PhD Dissertation was co-supervised by Gary Hatfield and Lisa Miracchi, and is titled "Cognition in Nature: Information, Explanation, and Embodiment." An abstract is included in my CV.
I am currently a gadfly in a theoretical neuroscience lab, aiming to improve my ability to convey ideas between philosophy and neuroscience and to collaborate on research that brings together the perspectives of these fields.
Referee Report on (Hypothetical) Phliosophy 101 Textbook
(with Ben Lansdell)
(forthcoming at Biology & Philosophy)
(forthcoming at Teaching Philosophy)
Symposium: Affirming Black Excellence in Cognitive Neuroscience
Cognitive Neuroscience Society 2021 Virtual
The Factivity and Nomicity of Information
Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology
Neural Dynamics and Inner Representations
SUNY Potsdam conference on Philosophy of Psychology
Weakness of Will, Resolutions, and Desires
The Philosopher's Cocoon Conference